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Article

Piling On: Collateral Consequences and
Community Supervision
Christopher Uggen & Robert Stewart

†

INTRODUCTION
As levels of criminal punishment have risen in the United
States, more and more citizens now face the collateral consequences of arrest and conviction. Such consequences are wideranging, placing limits on everything from occupational licensure to eligibility for public assistance to voting rights. This article brings a specific focus to how these restrictions affect nonincarcerated felons—those living in their home communities as
they complete a term of probation or parole. Although the legal
and informal restrictions are separable for analytic purposes,
we will demonstrate that people experience them in combination—as a pile of hopelessly tangled problems. While there has
been great recent interest in the collateral effects of imprisonment, far less attention has been devoted to collateral consequences during and after these periods of community supervi1
sion.
Many such restrictions are surely merited. Few would argue against limiting the gun rights of those convicted of drive† Christopher Uggen is Distinguished McKnight Professor of Sociology,
University of Minnesota; Robert Stewart is a sociology Ph.D. student and National Science Foundation Graduate Fellow at the University of Minnesota.
This Article represents their views and not National Science Foundation positions or policy. The authors thank Lindsay Blahnik for assistance in preparing
this article and Emily Baxter and Levi Lachappelle for thoughtful comments
on an earlier draft. Copyright © 2015 by Christopher Uggen & Robert Stewart.
1. See generally MARGARET COLGATE LOVE ET AL., COLLATERAL
CONSEQUENCES OF CRIMINAL CONVICTIONS: LAW, POLICY, AND PRACTICE
(2013); INVISIBLE PUNISHMENT: THE COLLATERAL CONSEQUENCES OF MASS
IMPRISONMENT (Marc Mauer & Meda Chesney-Lind, eds., 2002); Alec Ewald &
Christopher Uggen, The Collateral Effects of Imprisonment on Prisoners, Their
Families, and Communities, in THE OXFORD HANDBOOK OF SENTENCING &
CORRECTIONS 83 (Joan Petersilia & Kevin R. Reitz eds., 2012); Margaret Colgate Love, Collateral Consequences After Padilla v. Kentucky: From Punishment to Regulation, 31 ST. LOUIS U. PUB. L. REV. 87 (2011).
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by shootings or restricting access to children among those who
have assaulted preschoolers. Yet collateral consequences are
typically applied more universally (e.g., to all people convicted
of felony-level offenses) rather than being tailored to particular
offenses or individuals. While surveying the combined effects of
collateral sanctions on probationers and parolees, the term “piling on” came immediately to mind. In American football, “piling
on” occurs when one or more players jumps on top of a downed
2
player after a tackle has been made. It is illegal because it is
unnecessary, slows the progress of the game, and often results
in serious injury.
To that end, the evidence is mounting that at least some
collateral sanctions are, in effect, experienced as a form of piling on and, hence, impeding successful completion of community supervision and compromising rather than enhancing public
safety. Articles in the national media, reports from the American Bar Association and the Uniform Law Commission, federal
legislation such as the Second Chance Act of 2007, and public
hearings across the states are now squarely addressing the
challenge of community reintegration—and the barriers posed
3
by formal and informal collateral consequences. For example,
Democrat Cory Booker of New Jersey and Republican Rand
Paul of Kentucky recently introduced the REDEEM Act in the
U.S. Senate, a broad-based reform effort that would ease
expungement procedures and reduce collateral sanctions such
as bans on food stamps and public assistance for people con4
victed of drug crimes.
With the rapid growth of all correctional populations over
the past four decades, such efforts have taken on greater meaning for attorneys, researchers, policy makers, and, most importantly, people convicted of criminal offenses. As shown in
Figure 1, nearly seven in ten of those under correctional supervision in 2011 were not incarcerated but were instead super5
vised in their communities on probation or parole. Moreover,
even as correctional populations have risen, there has been a
tremendous revolution in scientific knowledge about crime over
the life course. We now have clear evidence that the over2. Roger Goodell, NFL, Official Rules of the NFL r. 12.2.6(d) (2013),
http://static.nfl.com/static/content/public/image/rulebook/pdfs/2013%20-%
20Rule%20Book.pdf.
3. See infra notes 10–11 and accompanying text.
4. See S. 2567, 113th Cong. § 3 (2014), available at https://www.congress
.gov/bill/113th-congress/senate-bill/2567/text.
5. See infra Figure 1.
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whelming majority of people convicted of crimes will eventually
6
desist from criminal behavior. Yet our law, policy, and public
discourse have lagged far behind this revolution in scientific
knowledge. We continue to proceed as though criminality crystallizes or inheres in individuals, such that many collateral
7
consequences are imposed indefinitely, if not permanently. In
this article we consider the balance of interests involved in tallying the costs and benefits of imposing various collateral sanctions.
8
Figure 1. Rising U.S. correctional populations, 1980–2011.

6. See JOHN H. LAUB & ROBERT J. SAMPSON, SHARED BEGINNINGS,
DIVERGENT LIVES: DELINQUENT BOYS TO AGE 70, at 275–93 (2013).
7. See Christopher Uggen & Lindsay Blahnik, The Increasing Stickiness
of Public Labels 2 (Nov. 30, 2014) (unpublished manuscript) (on file with author).
8. The source statistics for this figure are taken from the following U.S.
Department of Justice Bureau of Justice Statistics annual publications from
1980 to 2011. See generally LAUREN E. GLAZE & ERIKA PARKS, BUREAU OF
JUSTICE STATISTICS, CORRECTIONAL POPULATIONS IN THE UNITED STATES
2011 (2012), available at http://www.bjs.gov/content/pub/pdf/cpus11.pdf;
LAURA M. MARUSCHAK & ERIKA PARKS, BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS,
PROBATION AND PAROLE IN THE UNITED STATES, 2011 (2014), available at
http://www.bjs.gov/content/pub/pdf/ppus11.pdf; TODD D. MINTON, BUREAU OF
JUSTICE STATISTICS, JAIL INMATES AT MIDYEAR 2011—STATISTICAL TABLES
(2012), available at http://www.bjs.gov/content/pub/pdf/jim11st.pdf.
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We will also discuss how a second revolution has magnified
the effect of collateral sanctions. New and disruptive information technologies now make criminal records more accessible
and consequential, blurring the boundaries between public and
private information. We now know more about one another
than ever before, such that criminal labels are increasingly
sticky and consequential—and virtually impossible to “‘peel off,’
9
dissolve, or remove.” A criminal record check once required a
visit to the courthouse and the better part of an afternoon. Today, it only takes a few seconds to order up a comprehensive
criminal history from our phones or computers. And landlords,
employers, and curious friends and acquaintances are increasingly availing themselves of this information.
This Article assembles a diverse range of evidence to survey this landscape of “invisible punishments” and community
supervision. Part I describes the consequences of involvement
with the criminal justice system and their effect on probationers and parolees in the United States. We here enumerate these consequences and review their impact on those being supervised—including prospects for employment, education, and
social integration. We then conclude in Part II by sketching
some reform proposals to assist policy makers in distinguishing
necessary and useful collateral consequences from those that
appear to do more harm than good.
I. CONSEQUENCES OF CONVICTION
People convicted of crime are subject to a growing list of
federal, state, and local restrictions affecting their economic,
10
political, and social activities. These are often termed “collateral consequences” because they are typically located outside
the penal code, implemented by non-criminal justice institutions, and interpreted by the courts as civil regulations rather
11
than criminal penalties. Both the American Bar Association
9. See Uggen & Blahnik, supra note 7, at 2.
10. See generally Ewald & Uggen, supra note 1.
11. See generally INVISIBLE PUNISHMENT, supra note 1, at 26 (“The agencies that administer these sanctions are far-flung[] [and] have little or no connection with the criminal justice system.”); Velmer S. Burton et al., The Collateral Consequences of a Felony Conviction: A National Study of State
Statutes, 51 FED. PROBATION 52, 52 (1987) (“[C]ollateral consequences . . . refer[s] to the rights or privileges that are lost upon convicting as mandated by
state and Federal statutes.” (internal quotation marks omitted)); Michael
Pinard, An Integrated Perspective on the Collateral Consequences of Criminal
Convictions and Reentry Issues Faced by Formerly Incarcerated Individuals,
86 B.U. L. REV. 623, 634–35 & nn.60–61 (2006).
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(ABA) and the National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws (NCCUSL) have called attention to the expansion of federal and state collateral sanctions in the past two
12
decades. Following the ABA, the Court Security Improvement
Act of 2007 further distinguishes between collateral “sanctions”
(restrictions imposed automatically upon conviction) and “disqualifications” (other penalties a court, agency, or official is au13
thorized but not required to impose). This distinction is not
yet in wide use, though it is important for both policy and analytic purposes.
Although they are often associated with felony convictions,
collateral sanctions affect individuals at earlier and later stages
of criminal justice processing and pertain to non-felony offenses
(e.g., misdemeanors) as well. At the pre-conviction stage, parents can lose custody of their children immediately when police
find drugs in a home; similarly, many employers suspend
workers without pay when they are arrested or charged with
14
crimes, regardless of whether they are later convicted. Under
New York City’s Narcotics Eviction Program, even the issuance
of a search warrant may be sufficient to trigger eviction from
15
private or public housing. The imposition of such sanctions
varies dramatically across municipalities, but it is no exaggeration to suggest that each of the 12.2 million U.S. arrests each
16
year could trigger some form of collateral sanction. Of those
who are charged and convicted, misdemeanants as well as felons are often subject to such consequences. For example,
noncitizen residents convicted of misdemeanors may face de17
portation.
In light of the enormous scope and reach of collateral sanc12. Norman K. Maleng et al., ABA Standards for Criminal Justice, Collateral Sanctions, and Discretionary Disqualification of Convicted Persons, 2004
A.B.A. CRIM. JUST. SEC. [hereinafter Maleng]; NAT’L CONFERENCE OF
COMM’RS ON UNIFORM STATE LAWS, AMENDMENTS TO UNIFORM COLLATERAL
CONSEQUENCES OF CONVICTION ACT (July 9–16, 2010), available at
http://www.uniformlaws.org/shared/docs/collateral_consequences/uccca_final_
10.pdf.
13. See Court Security Improvement Act of 2007, Pub. L. No. 110–77,
§ 510(d)(1)–(3), 121 Stat. 2534, 2544 (2008).
14. See Ewald & Uggen, supra note 1, at 85.
15. See Scott Duffield Levy, The Collateral Consequences of Seeking Order
Through Disorder: New York’s Narcotics Eviction Program, 43 HARV. C.R.-C.L.
L. REV. 539, 544–54 (2008).
16. Crime in the United States 2012, FBI, http://www.fbi.gov/about-us/
cjis/ucr/crime-in-the-u.s/2012/crime-in-the-u.s.-2012/persons-arrested/personsarrested (last visited Mar. 31, 2015).
17. See Nina Bernstein, How One Marijuana Cigarette May Lead to Deportation, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 31, 2010, at A17.
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tions, it is difficult to provide a comprehensive overview of their
impact. We will therefore focus directly on sanctions that are
most salient for those under community supervision. As of December 31, 2012, nearly 4.8 million people, or one in fifty U.S.
18
adults, were serving a community supervision sentence. This
includes over 850,000 parolees and over 3.94 million probation19
ers. Because the full weight of collateral sanctions falls most
heavily on those convicted of felonies, we will focus primarily
on this group in our review. Approximately 3 million people are
currently serving time in their communities for felonies (this
includes almost all of the parolees, and 2.1 million felony pro20
bationers). We next catalog the individually separable economic, social, physical, and civic consequences of felony conviction. Throughout, however, we will return to the metaphor of
“piling on,” as we cite research literature, personal stories, and
interview data. Taken together, this evidence will demonstrate
how the total weight of collateral sanctions far exceeds their
individual impact.
A. ECONOMIC CONSEQUENCES
Any interaction with the criminal justice system, including
21
a single arrest, can have long-term repercussions on one’s
economic future. A criminal record creates both formal and informal barriers that restrict or limit career and educational opportunities, prohibit certain forms of economic assistance, and
22
significantly reduce lifetime earnings.
1. Employment
Criminologists have long recognized that employment
23
plays a key role in promoting desistance from crime, or the
18. LAURA M. MARUSCHAK & THOMAS P. BONCZAR, BUREAU OF JUSTICE
STATISTICS, PROBATION AND PAROLE IN THE UNITED STATES, 2012, at 1 (Jan.
1, 2015), available at http://www.bjs.gov/content/pub/pdf/ppus12.pdf.
19. See id.
20. See id. at 6.
21. See Christopher Uggen, Mike Vuolo, Sarah Lageson, Ebony Ruhland
& Hilary K. Whitham, The Edge of Stigma: An Experimental Audit of the Effects of Low-Level Criminal Records on Employment, 52 CRIMINOLOGY 627,
628 (2014).
22. See Sara Wakefield & Christopher Uggen, Incarceration and Stratification, 36 ANN. REV. SOC. 387, 393–96 (2010); NAT’L RESEARCH COUNCIL, THE
GROWTH OF INCARCERATION IN THE UNITED STATES: EXPLORING CAUSES AND
CONSEQUENCES 233–60 (Jeremy Travis, Bruce Western & Steve Redburn eds.,
2014).
23. See, e.g., John H. Laub & Robert J. Sampson, Understanding Desistance from Crime, 28 CRIME & JUST. 1, 17 (2001) (“[O]ffenders are charac-
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continued cessation of criminal behavior. Indeed, politicians
and criminal justice officials have pointed to the benefits of
steady employment as essential, both for putting distance between current and past behavior and as a potential avenue out
24
of poverty.
Paradoxically, though, a criminal past erects informal barriers that prevent individuals from finding jobs in the shortterm and, by extension, careers in the long-term. Hiring experiments conclusively demonstrate that a felony prison record
significantly decreases the rate of positive employer responses
25
or “callbacks.” For example, one study found that a felony
conviction reduced the callback rate by half for white male applicants and nearly two-thirds for African American male ap26
plicants. Our own later study probed the limits of such stigma
by testing the effect of a single three-year-old misdemeanor ar27
rest. We sent matched pairs of young men to apply for 300 entry-level jobs in Minnesota, assigning one member of the pair a
three-year-old disorderly conduct arrest. Figure 2 shows the results for our White and African American pairs in the no-arrest
(control) and arrest (treatment) conditions.

terized by . . . unstable employment.”).
24. Text of President Bush’s 2004 State of the Union Address, WASH. POST
(Jan. 20, 2004), http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-srv/politics/transcripts/
bushtext_012004.html [hereinafter Bush State of the Union] (noting that released prisoners unable to “find work or a home or help, they are much more
likely to commit crime and return to prison”); 1996 State of the Union Address,
WASH.
POST
(Jan.
23,
1996),
http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp
-srv/politics/special/states/docs/sou96.htm [hereinafter Clinton State of the Union] (outlining programs that “encourage people to move from welfare to
work”); Christopher Uggen & Jeremy Staff, Work As a Turning Point for Criminal Offenders, 5 CORRECTIONS MGMT. Q. 1, 3 (2001).
25. See Devah Pager, The Mark of a Criminal Record, 108 AM. J. SOC.
937, 947 (2003) [hereinafter Pager, The Mark]; DEVAH PAGER, MARKED: RACE,
CRIME, AND FINDING WORK IN AN ERA OF MASS INCARCERATION 58 (2007)
[hereinafter PAGER, MARKED].
26. See Pager, The Mark, supra note 25, at 958.
27. See generally Uggen et al., supra note 21.
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Figure 2. Effect of a single misdemeanor arrest on employer callbacks, by race

We found a four-percentage point difference between the
arrest and no-arrest groups in the rate of positive “callbacks”
by employers. Even a minor arrest record thus causes about a
15% reduction in the likelihood of callback for African Ameri28
cans and a 10% reduction for Whites. For those under supervision for felonies, of course, the effect is much greater.
These findings are echoed by the stories applicants tell
about their job search experiences. When we interviewed people released from prison as part of the Minnesota Exits and Entries Project, some told us that they did not disclose the record.
One said, “I won’t even put it down . . . . You know, first impression is everything.” When asked why not, he responded
bluntly, “If you check that box, they’re not going to hire you!
They’re going to be like, [h]e’s a felon! He might steal; he might
28. Id. The effect of the treatment is calculated by dividing the percentage
difference between callback rates of the control and treatment conditions for
each race by the callback rate of control condition. See id. at 637–39. For example, the difference in callback rates for the African American male testers
was 4% (27.5% – 23.5% = 4%). This amounts to an effective reduction in
callbacks for African American males of 14.5% (4 / 27.5 = 14.5%). For our
White testers, the treatment condition resulted in an approximately 10% reduction in callbacks (4 / 38.8 = 10.3%).
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29

rob us, you know, all the bad things!”
On the other hand, many told us that being truthful about
their criminal justice experience was the best approach, particularly since so much information is now so easily available. As
one person explained, “they can just check up [sic] online,
too . . . . You can find anything on the web. You type in somebody’s name, their whole entire profile comes up . . . . [T]here’s
30
no use in lying.” In other words, not only do people with records encounter criminal history questions on job applications,
but they also confront the ubiquitous availability of online
31
criminal records.
In recent years, the “ban the box” reform movement has
gained traction in reducing discrimination on the basis of such
records. Ban the box policies prohibit employers from asking
32
about criminal records on the initial application. As of this
writing, thirteen states, more than sixty municipalities, and
major firms such as Target Corporation had enacted ban-the33
box—many within the past five years. While researchers have
just begun to assess the effectiveness of these new policies,
their impact may be modest within the current context of
online criminal record availability. Here, as elsewhere, a single
legal change is unlikely to exert a large impact unless it is supported by a much broader transformation in privacy rights and
34
expectations.
Apart from this informal discrimination in hiring, people
with records also face formal jurisdiction-specific barriers in
the many fields that require occupational licensing and other
29. Interview by Shelly Schaefer with Participant in the Minn. Exits &
Entries Project (May 15, 2008) (on file with author). The Minnesota Exits and
Entries Project is a comparative study of reentry from different types of institutions. See Tim Brady, Exits, 3 FACETS 2, 3–4 (2008), available at http://
www.soc.umn.edu/assets/pdf/FacetsMay2008.pdf.
30. Interview by Arturo Baiocchi with Participant in the Minn. Exits &
Entries Project (2008) (on file with author).
31. See Sarah Esther Lageson et al., Legal Ambiguity in Managerial Assessments of Criminal Records, 40 L. & SOC. INQUIRY 175, 176 (2015).
32. See NAT’L EMPLOYMENT LAW PROJECT, SEIZING THE “BAN THE BOX”
MOMENTUM TO ADVANCE A NEW GENERATION OF FAIR CHANCE HIRING
REFORMS 2 (2014), available at http://www.nelp.org/page/-/SCLP/2014/
Seizing-Ban-the-Box-Momentum-Advance-New-Generation-Fair-ChanceHiring-Reforms.pdf.
33. Id. at 3–4. As of this writing, these states include California, Colorado,
Connecticut, Delaware, Illinois, Hawaii, Maryland, Massachusetts, Minnesota,
Nebraska, New Jersey, New Mexico, and Rhode Island. See id.
34. See, e.g., PAGER, MARKED, supra note 25, at 157 (explaining that sealing and expungement will be ineffective without careful oversight of credit reporting agencies and criminal background services).
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heavily regulated sectors. Several blanket policies on the state
and federal levels prohibit some or all people with felonies from
being licensed or permitted to work in certain occupations and
35
sectors. These include occupations in industries ranging from
36
37
38
the public sector, law, real estate, air transportation, race39
tracks, and any position in which an individual has “responsibility for the safety and well-being of children, the elderly, or
40
individuals with disabilities.”
Occupations with licensing criteria that do not explicitly
prohibit current or former felons often require a “good character” test. As Bruce May points out, character is ambiguous and
difficult to define legislatively; lacking a clear definition, licensing agencies and courts have come to accept a prior criminal
41
conviction as evidence of “bad character.”
The American Bar Association’s helpful national inventory,
supported in part by the National Institute of Justice, provides
much-needed basic information on federal—and state-specific
42
employment consequences. This site distinguishes between
discretionary restrictions and those that are mandatory or automatic, as well as the duration over which particular restrictions are imposed. State-specific websites, such as Ohio’s
CIVICC (Civil Impact of Criminal Convictions) and the list
maintained by the Texas State Law Library, are increasingly
43
aggregating and publishing such details online. For example,
35. See Miriam J. Aukerman, The Somewhat Suspect Class: Towards a
Constitutional Framework for Evaluating Occupational Restrictions Affecting
People with Criminal Records, 7 J.L. SOC’Y 18, 23 (2005).
36. See Karol Lucken & Lucille M. Ponte, A Just Measure of Forgiveness:
Reforming Occupational Licensing Regulations for Ex-Offenders Using BFOQ
Analysis, 30 L. & POL’Y 46, 47 (2008).
37. See Bruce E. May, The Character Component of Occupational Licensing Laws: A Continuing Barrier to the Ex-Felon’s Employment Opportunities,
71 N.D. L. REV. 187, 191 (1995).
38. 49 U.S.C. § 44936(B) (2012).
39. MINN. STAT. § 240.08 (2014).
40. 42 U.S.C. § 5119a(a)(1) (2012).
41. See May, supra note 37, at 195. May also discusses what he considers
to be less restrictive character tests, such as “honest and trustworthy” and
“reputable character.” Id. at 200–02. He argues that these statutes “present a
less demanding standard to the ex-felon because they allow somewhat for the
amelioration of the past felonious wrong through subsequent good conduct
and/or the rehabilitation of the ex-felon.” Id. at 200.
42. See generally Am. Bar Ass’n, National Inventory of the Collateral Consequences of Conviction, NICCC, http://www.abacollateralconsequences.org
(last visited Mar. 31, 2015) (interactive database).
43. See generally Civil Impact of Criminal Convictions Under Ohio Law,
CIVICC, [hereinafter CIVICC], http://civiccohio.org (last visited Mar. 31, 2015)
(interactive database); Felony Restrictions by Profession/Business License,
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Texas requires a test of good moral character for professionals
such as marriage and family counselors, while excluding all
44
convicted felons from positions as labor organizers. Similarly,
massage therapists are ineligible for a license if they have been
convicted of a “misdemeanor involving moral turpitude” or a
45
felony within the preceding five years. Some occupational licenses in Texas may be revoked following a felony conviction,
including those of licensed accountants, architects, and nurs46
es. Applicants confronting these “good character” statutes may
argue their case and they may have the opportunity to appeal
47
adverse decisions. At best, however, such appeal procedures
can only offer a precarious, daunting, and time-consuming path
to licensure.
Of course, an occupational license cannot guarantee a job,
nor can it insulate jobseekers from informal discrimination. Because conviction status is not recognized as a protected status,
most non-contract workers face an indefinite threat of being
fired solely on the basis of their criminal records. In 2012, the
U.S. Equal Employment Opportunity Commission issued a
lengthy enforcement guidance document designed to clarify
standards and provide “best practices” on how employers may
address criminal backgrounds without violating prohibitions
against employment discrimination under Title VII of the 1964
48
Civil Rights Act.
The guidance instructs employers to assess criminal records on an individualized basis, considering such factors as the
nature of the crime, the time since it was committed, and the
nature of the job. As of this writing, the extent to which these
policies have been adopted or enforced remains unclear.
In the abstract and in isolation, these barriers may appear
surmountable. But people subject to employment restrictions
rarely experience them only once and in isolation. It is much
more common that collateral consequences pile one atop the
TEX. ST. L. LIBR., http://www.sll.texas.gov/library-resources/collections/ statutory-restrictions-on-convicted-felons/profession (last updated Feb. 20, 2014)
[hereinafter TSLL].
44. See TSLL, supra note 43 (“Marriage and Family Therapist” and “Labor Union Officer or Organizer”).
45. Id. (“Massage Therapist”).
46. Id. (“Accountant,” “Architect,” “Nurse Aide,” and “Nursing Facility
Administrator”).
47. See id. (“Dyslexia Practitioner and Therapist”).
48. U.S. EQUAL EMP’T OPPORTUNITY COMM’N, CONSIDERATION OF ARREST
AND CONVICTION RECORDS IN EMPLOYMENT DECISIONS UNDER TITLE VII OF
THE CIVIL RIGHTS ACT OF 1964, at VIII (2012), available at http://www
.eeoc.gov/laws/guidance/arrest_conviction.cfm.

1882

MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW

[99:1871

other. We spoke with Michael, a married ex-felon with a two49
year-old son, who explained this “piling on” phenomenon. After serving over a year in prison for a felony driving while intoxicated conviction, Michael enrolled at a private college in
50
Minnesota. In less than four years, he earned a degree in so51
cial work, graduating with honors. Following graduation, he
52
faced licensing restrictions because of his felony record. He
passed the required examination and then petitioned the Board
53
to consider his case. He provided several letters of recommendation and support, as well as a lengthy account of his past
mistakes and his present state. After several months and multiple appearances before the Board, he was eventually granted
54
a license to practice social work in Minnesota.
His difficulties, though, did not end there. He applied for
several open positions throughout the state but was consistent55
ly rejected. After several months, he finally found a job in a
56
small town. He and his young family packed up and moved
across the state using most of their savings, and things were
57
going well at first. He was excited, he said, because “[y]ou
know I spent our savings to get up here because it was a chance
58
at a real career.” But then, as he recalled the experience:
After two months of working, I get pulled into the office by the director and my supervisor. [They said,] “Well you are great at what you
do and a fantastic social worker, but we don’t think it’s a good fit here
because of your past.” So they gave me the option of being terminated
59
or to resign.

When asked why now and not earlier, he told us, “[t]he
60
county commissioners forced them to do that.” In other words,
not only did his criminal record present an obstacle in the licensing process and the job search, it also came back to haunt
him in spite of his good performance. As he summed it up:
“[t]he worst part is getting looked [at] and told you are great at

49. Telephone Interview with Michael (Sept. 25, 2014). Michael is a pseudonym to protect his identity.
50. Id.
51. Id.
52. Id.
53. Id.
54. Id.
55. Id.
56. Id.
57. Id.
58. Id.
59. Id.
60. Id.
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what you do, but we don’t want you because of your record.”
2. Education

Knowing the barriers that await them in the labor market,
many people with records seek to improve their employability
through education. For most people, investing in human capital
makes good economic sense, as academic credentials are
strongly associated with both employment and earnings. As the
Bureau of Labor Statistics reported recently, those with a four
year bachelor’s degree are almost half as likely to be unemployed as those with only a high school diploma and, on average, they earn a salary that is roughly 1.7 times that of a high
62
school graduate (and 2.3 times that of a high school dropout).
Since the 1970s, increasing demand for skilled workers in the
United States has outpaced education levels among young
63
males, further advantaging college educated jobseekers.
Our analysis of changes in college application forms, however, suggests that a growing number of admissions offices are
now requiring applicants to disclose criminal history infor64
mation. Based on our preliminary interviews and extant research, officials cite campus safety as the principal reason for
requesting criminal history information, especially in the aftermath of major on-campus incidents such as the 2007 Virginia Tech shooting and the murder of two students at the Univer65
sity of North Carolina. To date, there has been scant research
61. Id.
62. Employment Projections, BUREAU LAB. STAT. (Mar. 24, 2014),
http://www.bls.gov/emp/ep_chart_001.htm. In 2013, the Bureau of Labor Statistics estimated that 7.5% of individuals with only a high school diploma were
unemployed, and the median weekly earnings for high school graduates who
were employed were approximately $651. Id. For bachelor’s degree holders,
the unemployment rate was 4% and weekly earnings for the employed were
approximately $1,108. Id. Median weekly earnings for individuals who did not
graduate from high school were estimated at $472. Id. Nevertheless, these data are for individuals age 25 and over and are full-time wage or salary workers. Id.
63. David Autor, The Polarization of Job Opportunities in the U.S. Labor
Market: Implications for Employment and Earnings, 23 CMTY. INVS. 11, 16
(2011).
64. Robert Stewart, Requiring Criminal History Disclosures in the College
Application Process, Address at the Law and Soc’y Meetings (May 31, 2014);
see also CTR. FOR CMTY. ALTERNATIVES, THE USE OF CRIMINAL HISTORY IN
COLLEGE ADMISSIONS: RECONSIDERED 7–22 (2010) [hereinafter CCA], available at http://www.communityalternatives.org/pdf/Reconsidered-criminal-hist
-recs-in-college-admissions.pdf (analyzing survey data on how colleges and
universities use these questions in practice).
65. See Darby Dickerson, Background Checks in the University Admissions Process: An Overview of Legal and Policy Considerations, 34 J.C. & U.L.
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connecting campus crime to admission of students with criminal records, but the little research that exists suggests that
66
such fears are likely overblown.
As in the employment context, disclosing a criminal record
at the application stage could disqualify an applicant outright
or tip the scale on an application that could go either way.
There has been too little research to estimate the magnitude of
this effect. But a survey of admissions officials found that more
than 90% viewed any felony conviction as particularly negative,
and more than 75% felt the same way about any drug or alcohol
67
offense. Our own interviews with admissions officials confirmed these findings. From their perspectives, no offenses
were automatic disqualifiers; however, felonies, and especially
68
violent crimes, were particularly concerning. In regard to supervision status, some admissions officials we interviewed preferred applicants to have completed their probation or parole
term before applying because it showed evidence of successful
reintegration; others told us they preferred that applicants
were still under supervision because it provided for another
69
layer of accountability.
In most cases, applicants who disclose a criminal record
are required to submit additional material for further scrutiny,
419, 431–33 (2008); UNIV. OF N.C. OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT, TASK FORCE ON
THE SAFETY OF THE CAMPUS COMMUNITY FINAL REPORT 3–5 (Dec. 14, 2004)
[hereinafter UNC REPORT], available at http://counsel.cua.edu/ res/docs/final
-safety-task-force-report.pdf; Matthew W. Pierce & Carol W. Runyan, Criminal Records and College Admissions, 16 INJURY PREVENTION 58, 58 (2010).
66. See, e.g., UNC REPORT, supra note 65, at 7. Screening out applicants
with records is unlikely to have large effects on campus crime rates. A campus
shooting on a University of North Carolina campus compelled the president of
the university to create the Task Force on the Safety of the Campus Community. Id. at i. This task force was commissioned to provide a thorough report on
safety on the University of North Carolina campuses. Id. The seventeenmember panel focused specifically on the pre-enrollment practices of the University of North Carolina’s system and campus security between 2001 and
2004. Id. at 12. Over this period, the total number of students enrolled at University of North Carolina campuses was approximately 250,000, and 1086
crimes were reported throughout the campus system. Id. at 4. Of the reported
crimes within this timeframe, only twenty-one were suspected to have been
committed by students with a prior criminal history and, of these, only eight
had self-disclosed their criminal history on their applications. Id. at i–ii. In
other words, less than 2% of all reported crimes within the campus system
were committed by students with prior criminal histories. See also Carol W.
Runyan et al., Can Student-Perpetuated College Crime Be Predicted Based on
Precollege Misconduct?, 19 INJURY PREVENTION 405, 405–06 (2013) (investigating lesser misconduct).
67. CCA, supra note 64, at 18.
68. Id.
69. Stewart, supra note 64.
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often by an ad-hoc admissions committee. For example, at least
one some New York public colleges require applicants with
criminal records to request a copy of the personal and confiden70
tial version of their records to be sent directly to the college
from the State Division of Criminal Justice Services, even
though state law prohibits sending these confidential reports to
71
a third-party. Such requirements are thus literally impossible
to legally satisfy, yet they continue in New York and elsewhere.
More often, applicants are required to submit letters from
themselves and/or criminal justice officials, sign releases for
various types of private records, and provide evidence of reha72
bilitation or good conduct. Recent research focusing on the
SUNY colleges has found that these additional requirements,
which can be quite onerous, lead to many applicants with crim73
inal records leaving the application process through attrition.
While colleges may count these applicants as “incomplete” rather than rejected, they are, for all intents and purposes, tacit
74
rejections. And, at an average cost of $41 per application, few
people with criminal records can afford to apply to a large
75
number of institutions.
Even if a current or former probationer or parolee successfully overcomes these barriers in the admissions process, they
may be ineligible for federal financial aid. Everyone applying
for federal financial aid must complete the Free Application for
76
Federal Student Aid (FAFSA). Question 23 of the FAFSA form
70. CTR. FOR CMTY. ALTS, INC., BOXED OUT: CRIMINAL HISTORY
SCREENING AND COLLEGE APPLICATION ATTRITUION 25 n.11 (2015), available
at http://www.communityalternatives.org/pdf/publications/Boxed Out_Full Report.pdf [hereinafter CTR. FOR CMTY. ALTS, INC., BOXED OUT]; Stewart, supra
note 64. Supplemental Requirement Letter, Purchase College-State University
of New York (on file with authors) (showing that applicants who acknowledge
a felony record when applying to Purchase College, a member of the State
University of New York system, are sent a standardized letter from the college
that requires them to send a request to the Division of Criminal Justice Services “ask that records be sent to me [the Director of Admissions]”). This issue
is referenced in CTR. FOR CMTY. ALTS, INC., UNNECESSARY AND
COUNTERPRODUCTIVE: SUNY’S CRIMINAL HISTORY SCREENING POLICY 2
(2014) [hereinafter CTR. FOR CMTY. ALTS, INC., UNNECESSARY AND
COUNTERPRODUCTIVE].
71. N.Y. COMP. CODES R. & REGS. tit. 9, § 6050.1 (2015).
72. CTR. FOR CMTY. ALTS., INC., BOXED OUT, supra note 70, at 23–33.
73. Id. at 49.
74. Stewart, supra note 64.
75. Delece Smith-Barrow, Colleges That Charge the Most for Applying,
U.S. NEWS (Sept. 16, 2014), http://www.usnews.com/education/best-colleges/
the-short-list-college/articles/2014/09/16/colleges-that-charge-the-most-for
-applying.
76. Federal Student Aid, U.S. DEP’T OF EDUC. (2014), https://studentaid
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asks applicants, “Have you been convicted for the possession or
sale of illegal drugs for an offense that occurred while you were
receiving federal student aid (such as grants, loans or work77
study)?” Applicants who answer “yes” must then complete an
additional form to determine whether they are currently eligible to apply for federal financial aid or whether they are subject
78
to an ineligibility period before they can apply. Those with a
single conviction for drug possession while receiving aid who
have not completed a federally approved chemical dependency
treatment program are ineligible to apply for financial aid for
79
one year from the date of the conviction. Applicants with two
drug possession convictions or one drug sales conviction are ineligible for two years from the date of the most recent conviction. And individuals with three drug possession convictions or
two drug sales convictions are ineligible until they successfully
80
complete a chemical dependency treatment program. Note
that the ineligibility periods begin at date of conviction and not
date of offense, thereby leaving those sentenced to community
supervision most exposed to these prohibitions.
3. Assistance
Apart from informal and formal barriers to work and
schooling, people with criminal records also face limited access
to public assistance. For example, when congress passed the
Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity Reconciliation
Act of 1996, welfare reform imposed new formal restrictions on
81
assistance for those with felony drug convictions.
.ed.gov/fafsa.
77. U.S. DEP’T OF EDUC., FREE APPLICATION FOR FEDERAL STUDENT AID,
3 (2014), available at https://studentaid.ed.gov/sites/default/files/2014-15-fafsa
.pdf. This question had been broader in scope, applying to any prior drug conviction: “A student who has been convicted of any offense under any Federal or
State law involving the possession or sale of a controlled substance shall not
be eligible to receive . . . . ” It was amended as part of the Deficit Reduction Act
of 2005 to read,
A student who is convicted of any offense under any Federal or State
law involving the possession or sale of a controlled substance for conduct that occurred during a period of enrollment for which the student was receiving any grant, loan, or work assistance under this title
shall not be eligible to receive . . . .
Pub. L. No. 109–171, § 8021(c), 120 Stat. 178, 8021 (2005).
78. Student Aid Eligibility Worksheet, U.S. DEP’T EDUC. (2014), https://
studentaid.ed.gov/sites/default/files/2014-15-student-aid-eligibility-drug
-worksheet.pdf.
79. 20 U.S.C. § 1091 (r)(1) (2012).
80. Id.
81. Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity Reconciliation Act of
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With Melissa Thompson, we investigated whether this
change, banning individuals with felony convictions from re82
ceiving aid, affected female arrest rates. Thompson and Uggen
compared arrest rates of the states that chose to opt-out of the
ban altogether (i.e., not banning drug felons from receiving assistance) with states that only partially opted out and those
that did not opt-out (i.e., banning drug felons from receiving assistance). We found a significantly greater increase in female
arrest rates in states that imposed the ban relative to those
83
with a partial ban or no ban at all. Although it is difficult to
make causal claims on the basis of these state-level data, a
supplemental individual-level analysis of the National Longitudinal Survey of Youth (NLSY97) also showed less drug crime
and property crime among female public assistance recipients
84
during periods in which they received assistance. Taken together, such work suggests that the denial of benefits may have
had the unintended consequence of increasing crime rates.
Informally, the stigma of criminal records has also been invoked in punishing those who fail to disclose criminal convictions. Take, for example, the case of Anita McLemore, a single
mother of two teenagers, who was convicted of submitting a
85
false claim for food assistance. McLemore had failed to disclose her felony drug convictions on assistance applications.
She pled guilty to the charges and repaid the $4,367 in benefits
she received. The federal sentencing guidelines suggested a
sentence ranging from two to eight months, and the prosecution recommended the lower end of the guideline sentence.
Nevertheless, U.S. District Court Judge Henry Wingate instead
sentenced her to three years in prison. As he put it, “The de86
fendant’s criminal record is simply abominable.” Legal scholar
Kaaryn Gustafson suggests that Ms. McLemore “was deemed
criminal because she failed to declare herself a criminal on wel87
fare documents.” As Gustafson points out, even though
1996, Pub. L. No. 104–193, 110 Stat. 2105 (codified as amended in scattered
sections of 42 U.S.C.).
82. Melissa Thompson & Christopher Uggen, How Welfare Reform Drove
Up Female Arrest Rates 3–5, (June 19, 2013) (unpublished manuscript) (on
file with authors).
83. Id. at 11.
84. Id. at 16.
85. Matt Taibbi, Woman Gets Jail for Food-Stamp Fraud: Wall Street
Fraudsters Get Bailouts, ROLLING STONE (Nov. 17, 2011), http://www
.rollingstone.com/politics/news/woman-gets-jail-for-food-stamp-fraud-wallstreet-fraudsters-get-bailouts-20111117.
86. Id.
87. Kaaryn Gustafson, Degradation Ceremonies and the Criminalization
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McLemore and her family were living in poverty during these
years and would surely have qualified for state assistance had
it not been for her drug convictions, this was never considered
88
as a factor in the case. Instead, her criminal record appears to
89
have superseded all other factors in her sentencing.
B. SOCIAL CONSEQUENCES
Apart from their economic impact, a history of criminal
convictions has far-reaching social effects. These are felt most
keenly in intimate relationships, parenting experiences, and
social interactions. In recent years, the social impact of criminal convictions has been heightened dramatically by the increasing accessibility of online criminal records to the general
public.
1. Online Criminal Records
Although criminal records have long been considered public information in the United States, they did not become easily
90
accessible to the general public until very recently. A criminal
background check often required either travel to the local
courthouse or submission of a mail request that could take days
or weeks to process. But this changed as both public agencies
(courts, law enforcement, and corrections) and private firms
began aggregating and disseminating information about arrests and cases online. Thus, access to criminal record information has expanded exponentially over the last two decades.
Today, typing a probationer’s name into a simple Google search
will often yield everything from original “mugshot” photographs
to detailed case information, including charges, convictions,
and dispositions—as well as solicitations to conduct more extensive searches for a fee.
of Low-Income Women, 3 U.C. IRVINE L. REV. 297, 308 (2013).
88. Id. at 307–08.
89. Id. at 308.
90. See Steven Raphael, Improving Employment Prospects for Former
Prison Inmates: Challenges and Policy, in CONTROLLING CRIME: STRATEGIES
AND TRADEOFFS 521, 521 (Philip J. Cook et al. eds., 2012); Christopher Uggen,
The Effect of Criminal Background Checks on Hiring Ex-Offenders, 7
CRIMINOLOGY & PUB. POL. 367, 368 (2008); Michael A. Stoll & Shawn D.
Bushway, The Effect of Criminal Background Checks on Hiring Ex-Offenders,
7 CRIMINOLOGY & PUB. POL. 371, 372–74 (2008); Richard Freeman, Incarceration, Criminal Background Checks, and Employment in a Low(er) Crime Society, 7 CRIMINOLOGY & PUB. POL. 405, 406–07 (2008); Bruce Western, Criminal
Background Checks and Employment Among Workers with Criminal Records,
7 CRIMINOLOGY & PUB. POL. 413, 413–16 (2008); Uggen et al., supra note 21,
at 628.
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The expansion of access to criminal record information has
given birth to an entire online industry dedicated to its dissemination. These sites typically publicize all information, regardless of whether a case was dismissed or the defendant was
found not guilty. Mugshots.com provides the following disclaimer in its FAQ:
In Criminal Law, a mugshot is a booking photograph taken during
investigation. It isn’t an accusation nor an admission. Regardless of
case resolution, the arrest (or other incident with the law) has happened, and a booking photograph was taken. This by itself is true and
factual and this is what a mugshot represents. It does not represent a
91
case resolution, guilty plea, or not guilty plea.

Even the simplest interaction with the justice system can
therefore result in an indefinite, if not permanent, online posting of one’s photograph and charges.
The expressed purpose of many such websites is to protect
92
public safety. In the case of a few of these websites, this may
93
be their only purpose. However, most such sites also attempt
to wring cash from their subjects, charging fees to people des94
perate to remove their records. For example, Mugshots.com
currently charges $399 to have a mugshot removed. That fee,
though, only pertains to removal of a single arrest record from
91. What Is a Mugshot?, MUGSHOTS, http://mugshots.com/faq.html (last
visited Oct. 20, 2014).
92. Mugshots.com Is a “Google for Mugshots,” MUGSHOTS, http://
www.mugshots.com/faq (last visited Mar. 31, 2015). Mugshots.com characterizes itself as
a search engine for Official Law Enforcement records, specifically
booking photographs, mugshots. Originally collected and distributed
by Law Enforcement agencies, Booking [sic] records are considered
and legally recognized as public records, in the public domain.
Mugshots.com reproduces and republishes these Official Records in
their original form (“as is”) under the First Amendment to the United
States Constitution, the freedom to publish true and factual information.
Id.
93. See, e.g., Have a Question?, BUSTED MUGSHOTS, http://www
.bustedmugshots.com/contact (last visited Mar. 31, 2015) (offering to consider
removal in cases of “expunged, restricted, sealed or deceased cases”). But see
Free Opt-Out, JAILBASE, http://www.jailbase.com/en/about/#freeoptout (last
visited Mar. 31, 2015), for an online database of criminal record information
that is an outlier among these types of websites. It offers free removal of criminal record information, stating, “JailBase provides a free opt-out for individuals who do not want their arrest information posted on our site. The opt-out
goes into affect [sic] 30 days from the request. We feel this balances the need
for timely public arrest information and the needs of those arrested.” Id.
94. See Sarah Lageson, The Enduring Effects of Online Mug Shots,
SOCIETY PAGES (May 19, 2014), http://thesocietypages.org/roundtables/
mugshots; see also Lashaway v. D’Antonio III, No. 3:13-cv-01733 (N.D. Ohio
2013) (naming JustMugShots.com as defendant).
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that particular website; in order to remove one’s complete criminal record from multiple websites, one would either have to
pay hundreds of dollars to each site or pay thousands of dollars
to an online reputation management firm. Even then, it is quite
likely that the information would resurface again on a different
site. Moreover, some mugshot sites go well beyond the ostensible ‘public safety’ purpose—identifying individuals as “hotties,”
“hunks,” or “bad babes,” or ridiculing them with “Darwin
95
awards.” Such characterizations are clearly designed to objectify, dehumanize, and humiliate people for commercial purposes. Importantly, these websites are not held to any standards of
accuracy; therefore, they will charge even to remove mistaken
96
or erroneous information.
2. Relationships
The widespread availability of online records also brings
informal social consequences. Online arrest or conviction records brand people as criminals throughout their supervision
and into perpetuity. The disruptive effects of these online records are difficult to quantify because they are so diverse and
pervasive. For example, searching online for information about
current or potential romantic partners is now a common dating
practice. One recent survey reported that 47% of single daters
97
research their dates online. In this context, a criminal record
can have the same initial disqualifying effect as it does in the
employment or education context by limiting the pool of potential partners. This practice similarly pertains to potential
friends, colleagues, and acquaintances. The parents of a child’s
play-date, for example, may become apprehensive about allowing their child to be supervised by a parent with a criminal record. In short, individuals with criminal records are increasingly
95. Avi Steinberg, Hotties, Hunks, Beat up, Celebrities: The Allure of the
Mug Shot, THE NEW YORKER (June 13, 2012), http://www.newyorker
.com/culture/culture-desk/hotties-hunks-beat-up-celebrities-the-allure-of-themug-shot.
96. Each site has different policies, but this “disclaimer of warranties”
provided by Mugshots.com (and its affiliate, UnpublishArrest.com) is typical:
“UnpublishArrest.com does not warrant or make any representations concerning the accuracy, likely results, or reliability of the use of services or Content
on its Website or on any sites linked to this site.” Terms of Service and Use,
UNPUBLISHED ARREST, http://unpublishedarrest.com/terms-of-service (last visited Mar. 31, 2015). These terms of service go on to note that Mugshots.com
may provide a “courtesy removal” for sealed or expunged records—but only
after applicants pay a “document verification” fee of $199 per arrest. Id.
97. Singles in America: First Dates, MATCH (2014), http://blog.match
.com/singlesinamerica/first-dates (last visited Mar. 31, 2015).
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socially isolated by virtue of their records.
While we all have a keen interest in learning the past behavior or our potential intimate partners, such knowledge may
come at a steep societal cost. A convincing line of criminological
research shows that lack stable and supportive family relation98
ships is closely tied to future criminality. To the extent that
online searches stoke or exaggerate fear of people with records,
they may thus contribute to probation and parole failure, as
well as greater crime and recidivism.
3. Parenting
A criminal record can similarly become an obstacle to good
parenting. For example, many U.S. school districts restrict parents with criminal records from volunteering at a child’s school
99
for various types of events, such as chaperoning field trips. In
some cases, parents are denied regardless of the length of time
since the offense or whether the parent was a juvenile at the
100
time of the offense. Recently a parent in Tuscola County,
Michigan applied to volunteer as a chaperone for his sevenyear-old son’s field trip, but was denied because of the felony
breaking and entering conviction he received when he was sev101
enteen—almost twenty years prior.
Although this parent
found support from some of the other parents, several felt the
98. See, e.g., Ryan King et al., The Context of Marriage and Crime: Gender, the Propensity To Marry, and Offending in Early Adulthood, 45
CRIMINOLOGY 33, 55–59 (2007); LAUB & SAMPSON, supra note 6; Bill McCarthy
& Teresa Casey, Love, Sex and Crime: Adolescent Romantic Relationships and
Offending, 73 AM. SOC. REV. 944, 944–46 (2008).
99. News reports of parents being denied volunteering opportunities indicate that even these bans are rarely spelled out in policy, they become de facto
bans in practice. Some districts ban some or all felons outright. See Devin
Katayama, JCPS Background Checks Block Parents from Volunteering, Even
for Years-Old Offenses, WFPL NEWS (Aug. 25, 2013), http://wfpl.org/jcps
-background-checks-block-parents-volunteering-even-years-old-offenses; Gabrielle Russon, Criminal Past Could Keep Parents from Volunteering at Sarasota Schools, HERALD-TRIBUNE (Sep. 2, 2014), http://www.heraldtribune
.com/article/20140902/ARTICLE/140909932; Samantha Allen, Despite Pleading with Board, Mom with Felony Can’t Volunteer at Son’s School in Farmington, FOSTER’S DAILY DEMOCRAT (May 18, 2012), http://www.fosters.com/
apps/pbcs.dll/article?AID=/20120518/GJNEWS_ 01/705189909; Monica Scott,
Parents with Criminal Records, ACLU Lobby Grand Rapids School Board
Again To Change Its Volunteer Policy, MLIVE (Sept. 19, 2011), http://www
.mlive.com/news/grand-rapids/index.ssf/2011/09/parents_with_criminal_
records.html.
100. See Katayama, supra note 99; James Felton, School to Ex-Con Dad:
No, You Can’t Be a Chaperone, WNEM (May 10, 2012), http://www.wnem
.com/story/18274487/school-to-ex-con-dad-no-you-cant-be-a-chaperone.
101. Felton, supra note 100.
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ban was justified. One of those parents was quoted saying, “I
wouldn’t want my child around him. It would depend on what
they’re convicted of, but if they’re a felon, they don’t need to be
102
around kids like that.” Parents are often similarly barred
from extracurricular activities outside of school, including
103
youth coaching.
The more direct consequences of a criminal record, and especially incarceration, are decidedly more severe and damaging. More than half of all incarcerated men and women are
104
parents. The mere fact of parental incarceration, which necessarily separates the parent from the child for some period of
time, has detrimental effects on children. The American Bar
Foundation and National Science Foundation convened a 2013
White House workshop to review research on the collateral
105
costs of parental incarceration on children. On average, problems in school, the home, and involvement in criminal behavior
106
all increase when a parent is or has been incarcerated.
The consequences of parental incarceration are lasting and
intergenerational, reaching well beyond incarcerated individuals to affect their children and communities.
In many cases, loss of parental involvement does not end
with incarceration. Parolees and others with criminal records
face the possibility of losing custody of their children and/or
having their parental rights terminated by the state. In many
states, incarceration alone is grounds for termination of parental rights, while other states consider incarceration as a salient
107
factor in assessing parental rights. Even in the absence of in102. Id.
103. Jeff DiVeronica, Youth Sports Making Background Checks Priority for
Coaches,
DEMOCRAT
&
CHRONICLE
(May
7,
2012),
http://roc
.democratandchronicle.com/article/20120507/SPORTS/305070017/Youth
-sports-making-background-checks-priority-coaches.
104. LAUREN E. GLAZE & LAURA M. MARUSCHAK, BUREAU OF JUSTICE
STATISTICS, SPECIAL REPORT: PARENTS IN PRISON AND THEIR MINOR
CHILDREN 1 (2010), available at http://www.bjs.gov/content/pub/pdf/pptmc.pdf.
The Bureau of Justice Statistics found that 52% of state inmates and 63% of
federal inmates had minor children, accounting for approximately 2.3% of
children in the United States. Id.
105. For a review of conference presentations, see Christopher Uggen &
Suzy McElrath, Parental Incarceration: What We Know and Where We Need
To Go, 104 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 597 (2014). For an excellent empirical
treatment of the issue, see Sara Wakefield & Chris Wildeman, Mass Imprisonment and Racial Disparities in Childhood Behavioral Problems, 10 CRIM. &
PUB. POLICY 793, 806 (2011).
106. Id.
107. See generally CHILD WELFARE INFORMATION GATEWAY, U.S.
CHILDREN’S BUREAU, GROUNDS FOR INVOLUNTARY TERMINATION OF
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carceration, a criminal conviction can be grounds for terminat108
ing parental rights in some state jurisdictions. For example, a
parent’s rights in Georgia can be terminated following a conviction if the parent’s conviction “has a demonstrable effect on the
109
quality of the parent-child relationship.”
Criminal convictions are also admissible in custody hearings, which often pivot on determinations of the best interests
110
of the child. To be sure, a history of convictions affecting the
parent’s ability to care for the child, such as convictions for
physical abuse, must be considered seriously in a custody hearing. Nevertheless, many family courts also consider convictions
unrelated to the care of the child. As one legal scholar argues,
“The parent is denied custody, not because he or she mistreated
the child, but because the parent is the ‘sort of person’ who
111
might.” Here too, criminal stigma may supersede all other
criteria to become the overriding determinant of such decisions.
This is also the case for people with criminal records who
wish to adopt or foster a child. Every U.S. state requires a criminal background check for potential adoptive or foster par112
ents. Though not all criminal convictions automatically disqualify prospective parents, by federal law the parent(s) will be
denied if any adult living in the household has ever been convicted of crimes against a child, child abuse, neglect, or a crime
113
involving violence. Further, households with an adult member who has been convicted of a felony crime of physical assault, battery, or a drug offense in the past five years will also
114
be rejected. Such restrictions can also separate siblings. For
PARENTAL RIGHTS (Jan. 2013), available at https://www.childwelfare.gov/
pubPDFs/groundtermin.pdf (detailing grounds for the termination of a parental rights).
108. Peter D. Schneider, Criminal Convictions, Incarceration, and Child
Welfare: Ex-Offenders Lose Their Children, in EVERY DOOR CLOSED: BARRIERS
FACING PARENTS WITH CRIMINAL RECORDS 53, 56 (Ctr. for Law and Soc. Policy
and Cmty. Legal Servs., Inc. eds., 2002).
109. GA. CODE ANN. § 15-11-94(b)(4)(B)(iii)(2010).
110. Tamar Lerer, Sentencing the Family: Recognizing the Needs of Dependent Children in the Administration of the Criminal Justice System, 9 NW.
J. OF L. & SOC. POL’Y 24, 37 (2013).
111. Deborah Ahrens, Not in Front of the Children: Prohibition on Child
Custody As Civil Branding for Criminal Activity, 75 N.Y.U. L. REV. 737, 774
(2000).
112. CHILD WELFARE INFORMATION GATEWAY, U.S. CHILDREN’S BUREAU,
CRIMINAL BACKGROUND CHECKS FOR PROSPECTIVE FOSTER AND ADOPTIVE
PARENTS 3 (2011), available at https://www.childwelfare.gov/pubPDFs/
background.pdf.
113. See 42 U.S.C. § 671(a)(20)(B)(i) (2012).
114. See id. § 671(a)(20)(A)(ii).
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example, if a child in foster care is involved in a fight and arrested for assault, his brother or sister may be barred from re115
siding in the same foster care home. In such cases, one sibling
could be considered dangerous and the other a vulnerable person.
Finally, courts in at least two states have upheld draconian
restrictions on procreation as a condition of probation. Bans on
procreation as a condition of probation had long been struck
down by the courts, but that changed with a pair of recent cas116
es in Oregon and Wisconsin. In Oregon, a man convicted of
criminal mistreatment was required, as a condition of his probation, to complete drug treatment and anger management be117
fore he had any more children. He appealed, arguing that
banning him from having children was a violation of his consti118
tutional rights. The Oregon Court of Appeals rejected his appeal, ruling that because the court could later modify the condi119
tion, it was not a “total ban.” A few years later, the Wisconsin
Supreme Court upheld a similar ban in the case of a father of
nine children in Wisconsin who was convicted of not paying
120
child support.
C. PHYSICAL CONSEQUENCES
Criminal convictions also influence one’s physical location
and well-being. Formal and informal restrictions often limit
housing options, freedom of movement, and immigration status, while compromising physical and mental health.
1. Housing
In his famous 1996 State of the Union speech, President
Bill Clinton challenged housing authorities and tenant associations throughout the nation to rid themselves of “criminal gang
115. CHILD WELFARE INFORMATION GATEWAY, U.S. CHILDREN’S BUREAU,
SIBLING ISSUES IN FOSTER CARE AND ADOPTION 11 (2013), available at
https://www.childwelfare.gov/pubPDFs/siblingissues.pdf.
116. Joanna Nairn, Is There a Right To Have Children? Substantive Due
Process and Probation Conditions That Restrict Reproductive Rights, 6 STAN.
J. C.R. & C.L. 1, 7–8 (2010).
117. State v. Kline, 963 P.2d 697, 698 (Or. Ct. App. 1998).
118. Id. at 699.
119. Id.
120. State v. Oakley, 629 N.W.2d 200, 202 (Wis. 2001). The defendant was
sentenced to three years in prison followed by five years of probation, wherein
he was prohibited from having more children until he could show that he was
able to provide financial support for the children he already had and any future children. Id.
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121

members and drug dealers.” He urged that “the rule for residents who commit crime and peddle drugs should be one strike
and you’re out.” While providing safe living arrangements for
public housing tenants is certainly a worthy goal, such statements and resulting policies exacerbated housing problems for
people with criminal records. A combination of formal and informal consequences sharply curtails the availability of safe
and adequate housing options for those under community supervision.
U.S. federal housing policy has prohibited people convicted
of felonies and certain other crimes from receiving subsidized
122
housing since 1987. The “one strike and you’re out” policy,
signed into law in March 1996, reiterated the prohibition of
convicted persons and provided a legal basis to evict not only
the person committing the crime, but every member of the
household as well—regardless of their level or lack of involve123
ment in the crime. When this policy was challenged constitutionally, the U.S. Supreme Court affirmed its legality, and it
124
remains in force today.
Public housing assistance only makes up a small share of
125
the overall rental housing market. But as is the case in many
121. Clinton State of the Union, supra note 24.
122. Anti-Drug Abuse Act of 1988, 42 U.S.C. § 1437(d)(I)(4)(A)(ii) (2012).
123. Housing Opportunity Program Extension Act of 1996, 42 U.S.C.
§ 1437(d)(I)(6) (2012).
124. Dep’t of Hous. & Urban Dev. v. Rucker, 535 U.S. 125, 130 (2002). The
Secretary of the U.S. Department of Housing and Urban Development and
Acting Assistant Secretary for Housing did provide guidance in a letter to
HUD owners and agents. “The Department is asking owners of HUD-assisted
properties to seek a balance between allowing ex-offenders to reunite with
families that live in HUD subsidized housing, and ensuring the safety of all
residents of its programs. Accordingly, the Department encourages owners of
HUD-assisted properties to develop policies and procedures that allow exoffenders to rejoin the community to the extent that this balance can be maintained.” Letter from Shaun Donovan, Sec’y of U.S. Dep’t of Hous. & Urban
Dev’t, & Carol J. Galante, Acting Assistant Sec’y for Hous. for U.S. Dep’t of
Hous. & Urban Dev’t, to Owners and Agents of HUD-Assisted Prop. (Mar. 14,
2012),
available
at
http://www.ahscohio.org/UserFiles/Documents/All%
20States/MFamily%20properties_Re%20entry%20of%20Ex-offenders%
20memo.pdf; see also Letter from Shaun Donovan, Sec’y of U.S. Dep’t of Hous.
& Urban Dev., & Carol J. Galante, Acting Assistant Sec’y for Hous. for U.S.
Dep’t of Hous. & Urban Dev., to Publ. Hous. Auth. (PHAs) Exec. Dirs. (June
17, 2011), available at http://www.fhcmichigan.org/wp-content/uploads/2011/
06/Rentry-letter-from-Donovan-to-PHAs-6-17-11.pdf.
125. JOINT CTR. FOR HOUS. STUDIES OF HARVARD UNIV., AMERICA’S
RENTAL HOUSING: EVOLVING MARKETS AND NEEDS 3 (2013), available at
http://www.jchs.harvard.edu/sites/jchs.harvard.edu/files/jchs_americas_rental_
housing_2013_1_0.pdf. The Joint Center for Housing Studies at Harvard University estimates that renters receiving some type of government housing as-
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industries, the private sector tends to follow the government’s
lead. A 2005 survey conducted by one of the three main professional associations for rental housing found that eighty percent
126
of its members screened applicants for criminal records. Although the respondents in the aforementioned survey were
mainly large property owners, David Thacher points out that
the three best-selling landlord “how-to” books for small property owners all discussed criminal background checks and included criminal history questions in their sample rental applica127
tions. In fact, in his sample of twenty such “how-to” books
(ten published before 1990 and ten published after), Thacher
found that all of the post-1990 books discussed criminal records
128
while none of the pre-1990 books did so. Recall that federal
policy began barring felons from federal housing assistance in
1987.
There is little firm evidence regarding how these policies
affect housing opportunities for probationers, parolees, and
former felons. In our experience, however, they impose significant barriers to finding safe and suitable housing. For example,
129
Valerie recently moved to Minneapolis to enter a Ph.D. program. Prior to this, she lived on the east coast, where she had
completed a master’s degree while working two jobs and volunteering at a nonprofit organization. She was also an ex-felon,
having been convicted of two low-level felony drug charges almost ten years prior, for which she served less than a year in
prison. She told us, “I didn’t realize my record was going to be a
problem when I started looking for housing, so I didn’t think
much of it.” She quickly realized, though, that it would be a
major problem in Minnesota; every rental application she came
sistance made up just over 11% of the rental housing market. Of those receiving assistance, 2.2 million utilized housing vouchers, 1.3 million used subsidies tied to privately owned units (e.g., Section 8 housing), 1.1 million lived in
housing owned and operated by public housing authorities, and approximately
270,000 were beneficiaries of a housing program run by the U.S. Department
of Agriculture, Office of Rural Development.
126. As quoted in David Thacher, The Rise of Criminal Background Screening in Rental Housing, 33 L. & SOC. INQUIRY 1, 12 (2008).
127. Id.
128. Id. at 18. Thacher also provides a rich legal history that traces the
changes in premises liability law, state statutes, and the law enforcement–led
“landlord training programs” over time to the current state of affairs. Id. at 16.
In sum, “law and government have moved on several fronts over the past three
decades to make tenants’ criminal behavior part of the risk calculation that
landlords must consider.” Id. at 18.
129. E-mail from Valerie to Robert Austin Stewart, Ph.D. Student, Dep’t of
Sociology, Univ. of Minn. (Oct. 1, 2014) (on file with author). Valerie is a pseudonym to protect the student’s identity.
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across required a criminal background check. For this reason,
she called more than two-dozen lease offices and apartment
managers. Each of the nine managers with whom she spoke
told her that their criteria were either “no felonies” or “at least
ten years incarceration-free.” She left messages with her inquiry and her contact information at the offices that did not answer, but they never returned her call. Eventually she was able
to find a manager who was willing to rent to her, but not without a significant amount of searching and stress.
As Thacher put it, “from the perspective of ex-convicts
themselves, landlord screening is an especially significant form
of institutional exclusion because housing (along with employment) ranks as one of the most important needs it impinges
130
upon.” Coupled with the other barriers to employment and
social interaction, these blanket prohibitions serve to make reintegration and reentry more challenging for probationers and
131
parolees.
2. Movement
In addition to influencing housing options, a criminal record also imposes other geographic restrictions, generally by
prohibiting one from entering or leaving certain spaces. These
can take several forms, but we here address a few of the most
prevalent.
First, certain types of offenses or designations can trigger
spatial exclusion from areas near schools or other specifically
designated areas. Scholars have noted the rapid growth of spatial exclusion, or “banishment,” as a tool of social control and
132
another layer of punishment. For example, as a condition of
probation or release, individuals convicted of a variety of offenses can be restricted from designated geographic areas, such
133
as “drug-free zones” or “prostitution-free zones.” Entering
these zones for any reason can result in a violation of supervi134
sion, incarceration, or other sanctions.
130. Thacher, supra note 126.
131. Rue Landau, Criminal Records and Subsidized Housing: Families
Losing the Opportunity for Decent Shelter, in EVERY DOOR CLOSED, supra note
108, at 51.
132. KATHERINE BECKETT & STEVE HERBERT, BANISHED: THE NEW SOCIAL
CONTROL IN URBAN AMERICA 6–9 (2009); Katherine Beckett & Steve Herbert,
Penal Boundaries: Banishment and the Expansion of Punishment, 35 L. &
SOC. INQUIRY 1, 2–3 (2010) [hereinafter Beckett & Herbert, Penal Boundaries].
133. Beckett & Herbert, Penal Boundaries, supra note 132, at 9.
134. Id.
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Individuals subject to predatory or sex offender designations face similar geographic restrictions. In most jurisdictions,
they are barred from living in or near “child gathering places,”
such as schools, parks, playgrounds, bus stops, or childcare
135
providers. In some locales, these zones can range up to 2,000
136
feet, or more than one-third of a mile. These restrictions drastically limit where such offenders can find housing. For example, Orange County, Florida has restriction zones within 1,000
feet of places where children gather (attractions, bus stops,
137
daycares, parks, and schools). As a result, sex offenders are
restricted from living in 95.2% of residential areas in Orange
138
County. Elsewhere in Florida, Pastor Dick Witherow established “Miracle Village” as a religious community that is home
to over one-hundred registered sex offenders who could not oth139
erwise find housing. Despite such extreme social isolation, a
study by the Minnesota Department of Corrections found no re140
lation between residency location and sex offense recidivism.
Spatial exclusion also occurs on an even grander scale in
regard to international travel. Several nations prohibit individuals with criminal records and those on community supervision
141
from entering. For example, Canada deems travelers who
were convicted of offenses in other countries that would be
142
criminal offenses in Canada inadmissible.
Similar restrictions are placed on travel to the United Kingdom and Aus143
tralia.
135. Richard Tewksbury, Exile at Home: The Unintended Collateral Consequences of Sex Offender Residency Restrictions, 42 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV.
531, 537 (2007).
136. Id.
137. Paul A. Zandbergen & Timothy C. Hart, Residential Housing Options
for Convicted Sex Offenders: Investigating the Impact of Residency Restriction
Laws Using GIS, 8 JUST. RES. & POL’Y 1, 1 (2006); Jill S. Levenson & Andrea
L. Hern, Sex Offender Residence Restrictions: Unintended Consequences and
Community Reentry, 59 JUST. RES. & POL’Y 59, 63 (2007).
138. Zandbergen & Hart, supra note 137.
139. Lisa F. Jackson & David Feige, Sex Offender Village, N.Y. TIMES (May
21, 2013), http://www.nytimes.com/2013/05/22/opinion/sex-offender-village
.html.
140. Grant Duwe et al., Does Residential Proximity Matter? A Geographic
Analysis of Sex Offense Recidivism, 35 CRIM. JUST. & BEHAV. 484, 500–01
(2008).
141. See infra notes 142–44 and accompanying text.
142. Immigration and Refugee Protection Act, S.C. 2001, c. 27, s. 36 (Can.);
see also Reasons for Inadmissibility, GOV’T CAN. (Oct. 9, 2012), http://www.cic
.gc.ca/english/information/inadmissibility/who.asp.
143. Immigration Rules, Part 9 § 322(5) (U.K.); Migration Act 1958 (Cth) s
501(6) (Austl.). Conversely, nearly every member of the European Union par-
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In addition to spatial exclusion, a second form of movement
restriction affects noncitizens. Immigrants with criminal records are subject to detention and deportation following any interaction with the criminal justice system. As an illustration of
how precarious life can be for noncitizens with criminal records,
144
consider the case of Alex, a Mexican immigrant, as described
to us by his pro bono immigration attorney in Minneapolis.
Alex came to the United States illegally in the 1980s with
his parents, who were later granted amnesty. Alex eventually
obtained a green card by virtue of his mother’s status. As a result of a relationship with a 13-year-old when he was 16, Alex
was convicted of statutory rape and required to register as a
145
sex offender. When he was 23, he met his partner, Rosa, and
they have three children together and own their own home.
Their children are U.S. citizens.
Since his juvenile felony, Alex has had three convictions on
his record: (1) a gross misdemeanor for giving false information; (2) a gross misdemeanor for solicitation; and, (3) a failure to register in 2007. The failure to register charge was a result of forgetting to update his address with probation
authorities, which occurred more than fifteen years after his
sex offense conviction. He had not had any further arrests,
charges, convictions or even minor driving infractions since
2007. In 2014, an officer with Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) ran an old warrant search for Minnesota and
came across a 2007 warrant that was briefly active for Alex’s
146
failure to register charge. The ICE official then ran a thorough background check and found his other convictions. As a
result, ICE officers came to his home as he was leaving for
work, arrested him, and brought him to a detention facility
where he was processed and charged with having two crimes
ticipates in the Schengen Borders Code agreement which opens internal borders between member countries and sets immigration practices for external
borders, and there is no criminal record restriction for these countries. See
Regulation 562/2006, 2006 O.J. (EC) (establishing a Community Code on the
rules governing the movement of persons across borders called the Schengen
Borders Code).
144. E-mail from Alex’s Immigration Attorney to Robert Austin Stewart,
Ph.D. Student, Dep’t of Sociology, Univ. of Minn. (Oct. 2, 2014) (on file with
author). To protect the identity and confidentiality of the client, “Alex” was
chosen as a pseudonym, and the identity of his attorney shall remain confidential. Minor details of his case were slightly altered to protect his identity.
145. This is also a pseudonym to protect the identity of the client’s partner.
146. See Raquel Aldana, Of Katz and “Aliens”: Privacy Expectations and
the Immigration Raids, 41 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 1081, 1096–1121 (2008) (explaining an in-depth study of ICE’s practice of searching old warrants).
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involving moral turpitude. He was in danger of indefinite detention and deportation, but his attorney was able to convince
ICE to agree to cancel his removal. Others who lacked experienced representation have not been so lucky. Nevertheless,
Alex was detained for two months, which caused significant financial strain for his family, as he was the sole provider but
could not work while in detention.
3. Health
Collateral consequences of a conviction are also manifest in
tangible physical health effects. The first and most obvious consequence extends from the difficulty of finding stable and
worthwhile employment as discussed above. Healthcare access
in the United States is strongly interwoven with employment
and associated benefits, so a lack of stable employment dramat147
ically constrains healthcare choices.
Moreover, individuals
who are not employed or who lack the means to purchase
healthcare on the private market turn to public assistance for
148
healthcare. As noted above, however, restrictions on public
benefits for individuals with records can stand in the way of
quality or regular care.
Beyond a lack of available health care, mere contact with
the criminal justice system can have detrimental long-term
health effects. Short-term health actually tends to improve during spells of incarceration, as many inmates lacked adequate
149
care before incarceration. Nonetheless, these improvements
150
are not long-lasting and largely dissipate following release. In
fact, compared to the general public, people who have spent any
time in the prison system are more likely to have major health
issues later in life—a finding that holds even in the most rigor151
ously designed investigations.
Specifically, midlife health
functioning is significantly worsened by prior exposure to in147. Congress passed healthcare reform in 2010 that mandated employers
with more than fifty employees to offer health insurance to offer their full-time
employees. See Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, Pub. L. No. 111148, 124 Stat. 119 (2010) (codified in scattered sections of 42 U.S.C.).
148. See David Dooley, Jonathan Fielding, & Lennart Levi, Health and
Unemployment, 17 ANN. REV. PUB. HEALTH 449, 459 (1996).
149. See Jason Schnittker et al., Incarceration and the Health of the African American Community, 8 DU BOIS REV.: SOC. SCI. RES. ON RACE 133, 135
(2011).
150. Jason Schnittker & Andrea John, Enduring Stigma: The Long-Term
Effects of Incarceration on Health, 48 J. HEALTH & SOC. BEHAV. 115, 123
(2007).
151. Id.
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152

carceration. Furthermore, formerly incarcerated individuals
appear to suffer disproportionately from depression, infectious
153
diseases, and stress-related ailments.
D. CIVIL CONSEQUENCES
People convicted of crime, particularly felony-level offenses,
also incur collateral consequences that restrict or prohibit myriad forms of civic participation. These sanctions vary from state
to state, but they include restrictions on participating in elections, serving on juries, owning firearms, and joining the mili154
tary. Some of these consequences, such as voting, are tempo155
rary in some states and permanent in others. But in the case
of the other restrictions, such as some types of military service,
156
the restriction is generally permanent.
1. Voting
The right to vote is perhaps the most visible and most di157
rect symbol of civic inclusion in a democratic society. Standing shoulder to shoulder with fellow citizens and participating
in the electoral process also encourages identification with the
152. Michael Massoglia, Incarceration, Health, and Racial Disparities in
Health, 42 LAW. & SOC’Y. REV. 275, 277 (2008).
153. Michael Massoglia, Incarceration As Exposure: The Prison, Infectious
Disease, and Other Stress-Related Illnesses, 49 J. HEALTH & SOC. BEHAV. 56,
65 (2008); see also Schnittker & John, supra note 150, at 126; Jason Schnittker
et al., Out and Down: Incarceration and Psychiatric Disorders, 53 J. HEALTH &
SOC. BEHAV. 448, 458 (2012).
154. Ewald & Uggen, supra note 1, at 3–4.
155. See JEFF MANZA & CHRISTOPHER UGGEN, LOCKED OUT: FELON
DISENFRANCHISEMENT AND AMERICAN DEMOCRACY 84–89 (2006) (finding that
even states with procedures for restoring voting rights actually restore very
few). As discussed below, Maine and Vermont currently have no felon voting
restriction; Illinois and 12 other states restrict voting for current prison inmates; California and 4 other states additionally disenfranchise parolees;
Minnesota and 18 other states additionally disenfranchise probationers; and,
Florida and 10 other states additionally disenfranchise many former felons
who have completed their sentences and are no longer under correctional supervision. See CHRISTOPHER UGGEN ET AL., STATE-LEVEL ESTIMATES OF
FELON DISENFRANCHISEMENT IN THE UNITED STATES, 2010, at 3, tbl.1 (The
Sentencing Project ed., 2012), available at http://sentencingproject.org/
doc/publications/fd_state_level_estimates_of_felon_disen_2010.pdf.
156. See Michael Pinard & Anthony C. Thompson, Offender Reentry and
the Collateral Consequences of Criminal Convictions: An Introduction, 30
N.Y.U. REV. L. & SOC. CHANGE 585, 586–87 (2006); see also Ewald & Uggen,
supra note 1, at 3 (stating that the restriction has been lifted in times of war
with special permission).
157. See generally Note, The Disenfranchisement of Ex-Felons: Citizenship,
Criminality, and “The Purity of the Ballot Box,” 102 HARV. L. REV. 1300, 1309
(1989) (discussing how “political participation is the path to moral growth”).
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158

norms and values of a community. As Adam Winkler put it,
voting is a “meaningful participatory act through which individuals create and affirm their membership in the community
and thereby transform their identities both as individuals and
159
as part of a greater collectivity.” Moreover, there is a robust
negative correlation between voting and subsequent recidivism,
suggesting that the prosocial nature of voting may contribute to
160
the civic reintegration of current and former felons.
Oregon is one state that permits probationers and parolees
161
to vote. Uggen and Inderbitzin “matched Oregon voting and
crime records and found that probationers and parolees who
exercise their right to vote have significantly lower recidivism
162
rates than those who do not.” As shown in Figure 3, the parole failure rate was 26.1% for non-voters and 19.3% for vot163
ers. “Oregon is an unusual case in that all voting is done by
mail; as such, the effect of civic participation may be even
stronger in states where voting is a more visible community
event and neighbors come together at the polls on election
164
day.”

158. Christopher Uggen et al., ‘Less than the Average Citizen’: Stigma, Role
Transition and the Civic Reintegration of Convicted Felons, in AFTER CRIME
AND PUNISHMENT: PATHWAYS TO OFFENDER REINTEGRATION 261, 277–79
(Shadd Maruna & Russ Immarigeon eds., 2004).
159. Adam Winkler, Note, Expressive Voting, 68 N.Y.U. L. REV. 330, 331
(1993).
160. See Uggen et al., supra note 158, at 277–79 for interviews with current and former felons about perspectives on voting and see Christopher
Uggen & Jeff Manza, Voting and Subsequent Crime and Arrest: Evidence from
a Community Sample, 36 COLUM. HUM. RTS. L. REV. 193, 196–200, 213 (2004),
for empirical support for a relationship between voting and desistance from
crime.
161. Christopher Uggen & Michelle Inderbitzen, The Price and the Promise
of Citizenship: Extending the Vote to Non-incarcerated Felons, in
CONTEMPORARY ISSUES IN CRIMINAL JUSTICE POLICY 63 (Natasha A. Frost et
al. eds., 2010).
162. Id.
163. Id. at 64 fig.3.
164. Id. at 63.
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Figure 3: Probationers and Parolees Who Vote In Oregon
Have Significantly Lower Recidivism Rates than Those Who Do
Not Vote

The U.S. Supreme Court clearly identifies disenfranchisement as a “nonpenal exercise of the power to regulate the fran165
chise” rather than punishment. Regardless of whether disenfranchisement is directly punitive or a collateral consequence,
its effects are widespread and well-established. Our most recent estimates put the number of persons disenfranchised for
criminal convictions at approximately 5.85 million, or one in
166
forty American adults. Disenfranchisement laws vary from
state to state, though all but two states (Maine and Vermont)
disenfranchise felons for at least some period of time following
167
a conviction. Of the remaining states, thirteen restrict currently incarcerated individuals from voting, an additional five
restrict parolees, and an additional nineteen also restrict pro168
bationers. Eleven states continue to restrict the right to vote
165. Green v. Bd. of Elections of New York, 380 F.2d 445, 450 (2d Cir.
1967) (quoting Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86, 97 (1958) (plurality opinion)), quoted in Alec C. Ewald, “Civil Death”: The Ideological Paradox of Criminal Disenfranchisement Law in the United States, 2002 WIS. L. REV. 1045, 1058 (2002).
166. UGGEN ET AL., supra note 155.
167. See id. at 3, tbl.1.
168. See id.
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even after individuals complete their sentences —in some cas170
es for life.
Our interviews with disenfranchised probationers and parolees confirmed how the practice conveys a message of exclusion and reaffirms one’s outsider status. Several respondents
characterized voting as a “part of being a citizen and being an
171
adult.” In particular, one stated,
People don’t want to recognize that we can still be citizens and still be
patriotic even though we made a mistake . . . . I can’t say anything
because I don’t have a voice. Or ‘cause I can’t vote about it . . . . How
can you feel that you’re giving back to a community that you’re a part
of when you’re exiled from it by not being able to vote and have a
172
voice in it?

In other words, not being able to vote seemed to diminish
or hinder reintegration efforts. Some of our interview participants characterized disenfranchisement as just one more way
for the community to remind them of their outsider status:
[I] would like to someday feel like a, quote, “normal citizen,” a contributing member of society, and you know that’s hard when every
election you’re constantly being reminded, “Oh yeah, that’s right, I’m
ashamed.”. . . . It’s just like a little salt in the wound . . . . It’s just loss
after loss after loss. And this is just another one. Another to add to
173
the pile. . . .

As with other collateral sanctions, many of those directly
affected by disenfranchisement experience the practice as dra174
conian and purely punitive. These feelings have been echoed
by judges and other officials. In an opinion involving a voting
ban for certain misdemeanants, one federal judge called disenfranchisement “the harshest civil sanction imposed by a democratic society, . . . [T]he disenfranchised is severed from the
175
body politic and condemned to the lowest form of citizenship.”
He also condemned policies that broadly applied voting restrictions: “Such a shadowy form of citizenship must not be imposed lightly; rather, only when the circumstances and the law
169. See id. at 3.
170. MANZA & UGGEN, supra note 155, at 84–89 (describing the low rate of
restored voting rights).
171. See Uggen et al., supra note 158, at 278 (interview with a 38-year-old
incarcerated woman).
172. See id. at 278 (emphasis removed) (interview with a 37-year-old incarcerated man).
173. See id. at 277–78 (emphasis removed) (interview with a 49-year-old
incarcerated woman).
174. Id. at 278 (quoting a 37-year-old inmate who described
disenfranchisement as a lifelong punishment).
175. McLaughlin v. City of Canton, 947 F. Supp. 954, 971 (S.D. Miss.
1995).
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176

clearly direct.” However, voting restrictions, in most jurisdictions, are blanket prohibitions that are applied automatically
177
rather than imposed in a targeted or deliberate manner.
2. Juries
Voting is perhaps the most visible barrier to civic participation, but felon jury exclusion is even more widespread than
178
disenfranchisement. All but two states, Colorado and Maine,
bar felons on probation and parole from serving on juries, and
179
thirty-one states impose lifetime bans. The remaining states
bar some or all felons for life or for some period of time, such as
180
during periods of supervision. As a result, researchers estimate that “13 million citizens can never participate in a jury
and an unknown number of others are excluded for some period
181
of time.”
The racial impact of civil consequences is more salient in
some jurisdictions than others. Using census and criminal justice data, Darren Wheelock examined the racial impact of felon
182
jury exclusion in Georgia. Across the state, Wheelock estimated that 14% of African-American adults were prohibited
183
from jury service. But when the level of analysis shifted to
the county level, Wheelock found that more than half of the African-American men in some counties were excluded from the
184
jury selection process. In other words, the likelihood of an accused African-American male in these counties facing a jury
that was demographically representative of the community was
very small—with felon jury exclusions directly affecting the
185
constitutionally guaranteed right to a jury of one’s peers.
176. Id. Coincidentally, this is the same U.S. District Court Judge who sentenced Anita McLemore to three years in prison for welfare fraud. See Taibbi,
supra note 85.
177. MANZA & UGGEN, supra note 155, at 37.
178. AMY E. LERMAN & VESLA M. WEAVER, ARRESTING CITIZENSHIP: THE
DEMOCRATIC CONSEQUENCES OF AMERICAN CRIME CONTROL 85 (2014).
179. Darren Wheelock, A Jury of One’s “Peers”: The Racial Impact of Felon
Jury Exclusion in Georgia, 32 JUST. SYS. J. 335, 336 (2011).
180. Id.
181. LERMAN & WEAVER, supra note 178, at 85.
182. See generally Wheelock, supra note 179.
183. Id. at 347.
184. Id. at 348.
185. See Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145, 156 (1968) (discussing the
fundamental importance of the right to a fair and impartial jury to guard
against arbitrary action or prosecution in the American system of justice: “The
framers of the constitutions strove to create an independent judiciary but insisted upon further protection against arbitrary action. Providing an accused
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3. Other Consequences
Space limitations preclude a comprehensive discussion of
the many other collateral consequences of criminal convictions.
Nevertheless, it is important to note important restrictions on
military service, holding elective office, serving in certain posi186
tions, and registration requirements.
II. BROADER EFFECTS AND REFORM PROPOSALS
A decent job, secure housing, stable family relationships,
and a stake in one’s community surely rank among the strong187
est predictors of probation and parole success. Many of the
collateral sanctions discussed in this article thus fly in the face
of theory and research on desistance from crime. As President
George W. Bush put it in his 2004 State of the Union Address,
if people “can’t find work or a home or help, they are much
188
more likely to commit crime and return to prison.” As early as
1957, the National Conference on Parole called civil and political restrictions “an archaic holdover from early times,” and
189
urged their abolition. The time has surely come for a reasoned reassessment of the costs of broad-scope collateral sanctions.

with the right to be tried by a jury of his peers gave him an inestimable safeguard against the corrupt or overzealous prosecutor and against the compliant, biased, or eccentric judge.”).
186. See, e.g., AM. BAR ASS’N COMM’N ON EFFECTIVE CRIMINAL SANCTIONS
& THE PUB. DEFENDER SERV. FOR D.C., INTERNAL EXILE: COLLATERAL
CONSEQUENCES OF CONVICTION IN FEDERAL LAWS AND REGULATIONS 19–20
(2009), available at http://www.pdsdc.org/resources/publication/collateral%
20consequences%20of%20conviction%20in%20federal%20laws%20and%
20regulations.pdf; LEGAL ACTION CTR., AFTER PRISON: ROADBLOCKS TO
REENTRY 10 (2004), available at http://www.lac.org/roadblocks-to-reentry/
upload/lacreport/LAC_PrintReport.pdf; Gabriel J. Chin, The New Civil Death:
Rethinking Punishment in the Era of Mass Conviction, 160 U. PA. L. REV.
1789, 1790 (2012); Ewald & Uggen, supra note 1, at 3–4; Pinard, supra note
11, at 639; Love, supra note 1, at 97–98.
187. See LAUB & SAMPSON, supra note 6, at 6, 129, 146; Michael Massoglia
& Christopher Uggen, Settling Down and Aging Out: Toward an Interactionist
Theory of Desistance and the Transition to Adulthood, 116 AM. J. SOC. 543,
572–74 (2010) (finding certain markers of adulthood are correlated with lower
delinquency rates); Christopher Uggen, Work As a Turning Point in the Life
Course of Criminals: A Duration Model of Age, Employment, and Recidivism,
65 AM. SOC. REV. 529, 542 (2000).
188. Bush State of the Union, supra note 24.
189. Margaret Colgate Love, Starting over with a Clean Slate: In Praise of
a Forgotten Section of the Model Penal Code, 30 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 1705,
1708 (2003) (quoting NAT’L PROB. & PAROLE ASS’N, PAROLE IN PRINCIPAL AND
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A. CATALOGING
The first order of business is to continue efforts to catalog
and classify the myriad restrictions imposed on individuals.
With the support of the National Institute of Justice, the American Bar Association has dramatically advanced knowledge by
creating and maintaining an accessible website with a list of all
190
federal and state collateral consequences. To our knowledge,
this effort has been quite effective in reaching those directly affected by the sanctions, as well as practitioners and academic
191
researchers with no conviction history themselves. Similarly,
the Uniform Law Commission has offered model legislation by
192
which each state could do the same.
B. NOTIFYING
In the absence of clear and accessible jurisdiction-specific
lists of collateral sanctions, it is unsurprising that probationers,
parolees, and former felons remain confused about their rights
and restrictions. A second area for reform thus concerns the
need to apprise defendants and those leaving criminal supervision of the sanctions to which they are—or will be—subject. Defense attorneys are increasingly alerting clients, prosecutors,
193
and judges to the costs of collateral consequences. Those
providing such “holistic defense” have won favorable pleas and
dismissals “when they [were] able to educate prosecutors and
judges on the draconian hidden consequences for the clients
194
and their families.” Regardless of the wishes of clients and
defendants, however, such negotiations still depend critically
195
on the responsiveness of prosecutors and judges.
190. Am. Bar Ass’n, supra note 42.
191. See generally ABA Launches Online Databse of Collateral
Consequences of Conviction for Each Jursidiction, LEGAL NEWS (Dec. 17, 2014)
http://www.legalnews.com/detroit/1398611 (describing the benefits of the
database).
192. Collateral Consequences of Criminal Convictions: Barriers to Reentry
for the Formerly Incarcerated: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Crime, Terrorism, & Homeland Sec. of the H.R. Comm. on the Judiciary, 111th Cong. 12
(2010) (written testimony of Richard T. Cassidy, Chair, Drafting Committee on
Uniform Collateral Consequences of Conviction Act of the Uniform Law Commission), available at http://www.judiciary.house.gov/_files/hearings/pdf/
Cassidy100609.pdf.
193. McGregor Smyth, Holistic Is Not a Bad Word: A Criminal Defense Attorney’s Guide To Using Invisible Punishments As an Advocacy Strategy, 36
UNIV. TOL. L. REV. 479, 494 (2005).
194. See Smyth, supra note 193, at 490, 494.
195. Id. at 494–95 (stating that judges and prosecuters are more responsive
to consequences that “offend that basic sense of fairness”).
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C. SUNSETTING
A third reform proposal would routinely remove or “sunset”
restrictions after a pre-specified period. Criminologists using
diverse methodologies have shown that after approximately
seven years with no new offenses, the risk of subsequent crime
among former felons approximates that of the general population, providing a scientific basis for time-limited collateral
196
sanctions. In many jurisdictions, however, there is currently
no mechanism to remove certain designations, let alone “sunset” them, relegating those convicted of sex crimes to perma197
nent and caste-like hyperstigmatization. Such work calls for
renewed scrutiny of indefinite or permanent restrictions on
persons with criminal records.
D. TAILORING
Removing a blanket ban on all felons does not preclude the
imposition of sanctions as a condition of supervision. On the
basis of a pre-sentence investigation, judges are well-positioned
to identify a checklist of specific sanctions that may be imposed
198
or removed at sentencing. Such considerations could be folded
into the individual assessments of risk and dangerousness—the
same considerations that govern decisions about whether to incarcerate individuals or place them on community supervision.
Such work is a front-end sentencing analogue to the idea of
back-end “re-entry courts,” tribunals with the authority to lift
199
some or all sanctions.
E. ABOLISHING
Reformers are also calling for the complete abolition of particular restrictions, such as felon voting bans and restrictions
on public assistance, as well as rigorous cost-benefit analyses of
196. See Alfred Blumstein & Kiminori Nakamura, Redemption in the Presence of Widespread Criminal Background Checks, 47 CRIMINOLOGY 327, 338–
39 (2009); Megan C. Kurlychek et al., Scarlet Letters and Recidivism: Does an
Old Criminal Record Predict Future Offending?, 5 CRIMINOLOGY & PUB.
POLICY 483, 498–500 (2006).
197. See Corey Rayburn Yung, Sex Offender Exceptionalism and Preventive
Detention, 101 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 969, 1002–03 (2011); Christopher
Uggen & Heather R. Hlavka, Does Stigmatizing Sex Offenders Drive Down
Reporting Rates? Perverse Effects and Unintended Consequences, 35 N. KY. L.
REV. 347, 355 (2008).
198. See Maleng, supra note 12, at 3 (recomending that collateral sanctions
should be a factor in the sentencing determination).
199. Id. at 3–4 (giving examples of both the front-end and the back-end solution).
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200

others. On the basis of this review, we would offer another
proposal for consideration: shifting the default from sanction to
no-sanction. Under such a system, the collateral sanction would
be imposed for particular enumerated offenses or when otherwise merited (e.g., imposing disenfranchisement for those with
a history of voter fraud), but would not be routinely applied.
F. RESTRICTING
Most reform efforts target the formal legal consequences of
201
conviction. Insofar as criminal records remain widely disseminated, however, such reforms would leave the informal conse202
quences intact. Defenders of the current open-records system
argue that “the flow of cheap information about past criminal
behavior is not a genie that can be readily put back into Alad203
din’s lamp.” Despite potential legal and policy barriers to
“sealing” such records, there are many good models to impose
sensible restrictions on access to criminal history information.
Outside the United States, access to criminal records is far
204
more limited and closely guarded. Within the United States,
other potentially stigmatizing records (such as those related to
mental and physical health) are similarly and responsibly re205
stricted.
Many of these reform proposals are explicated in the Amer206
ican Bar Association’s Collateral Sanctions Standards. Most
importantly, adoption of such Standards would help ensure:
that defendants are fully aware, at the time of a guilty plea and sentencing, of all relevant collateral sanctions that will automatically
come into play as a result of a conviction; that the sentencing court
has authority to consider applicable collateral sanctions in shaping its
own sentence; and, that people who are subject to collateral sanctions
have an opportunity to obtain relief from a court or an administrative
207
agency.
200. See LEGAL ACTION CTR., supra note 186, at 22; ERIKA WOOD ET AL.,
JIM CROW IN NEW YORK 16 (2009), available at http://www.brennancenter
.org/sites/default/files/legacy/publications/JIMCROWNY_2010.pdf.
201. See supra Part II.C–F.
202. See supra Part I.B (detailing the social consequences of widely
available criminal records).
203. Freeman, supra note 90, at 408.
204. Elena Larrauri Pijoan, Legal Protections Against Criminal Background Checks in Europe, 16 PUNISHMENT & SOC’Y 50, 53–54 (2014).
205. Nicolas P. Terry & Leslie P. Francis, Ensuring the Privacy and Confidentiality of Electronic Health Records, 2007 U. ILL. L. REV. 681, 682–84
(2007).
206. See generally Maleng, supra note 12.
207. Margaret Colgate Love, Paying Their Debt to Society: Forgiveness, Redemption, and the Uniform Collateral Consequences of Conviction Act, 54
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CONCLUSION
While we have isolated each collateral sanction for analytic
purposes, we use the concept of “piling on” to emphasize that
people experience them collectively—as a totalizing system that
touches upon almost every aspect of social life. When they are
applied deliberately and appropriately, collateral sanctions
serve an important and necessary function in protecting public
safety. When applied indiscriminately and unnecessarily, however, they can slow or prevent reintegration and impose great
costs on individuals, their families, and their communities. Our
brief survey of the collateral consequences of criminal conviction suggests that we may have underestimated the costs and
exaggerated the benefits of the broad-scope application of collateral sanctions. In law as in football, “piling on” is unnecessary, retards our progress, and can result in serious injury.

HOW. L.J. 753, 781 (2011).

